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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintifl7Appellant,
Case No. 990470-CA
vs.
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ,
Defendant/Appellee.

Priority No. 2
:

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) and § 77-18a-l(2)(a).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in quashing the bindover and

dismissing the information against Perez because his alleged conduct did not rise to the
level of "damage" or "injury" to a jail required for conviction under Utah Code
Annotated § 78-8-418. This Court should review this issue under "an abuse of
discretion" standard which affords the trial court's legal conclusions little deference but
overturns his factual findings only if "clearly erroneous." See Rule 25(a), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure (granting trial court discretion to order dismissal of criminal
1

information). See also, State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265 (Utah 1998) (trial court has
discretion in its ruling regarding motion for new trial).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418
A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down,
destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The State appeals from the grant of Perez's motion to quash the bind-over and the
order of dismissal entered into this case by the Honorable Steven L. Hansen.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Daniel Cruz Perez was charged by information filed on or about February 19,
1998, in Fourth District Court with Damaging a Jail, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 (R. 4). At a preliminary hearing, Perez moved to
dismiss the charge (Prelim. Tr. at 17). The magistrate denied his motion and he was
bound over for arraignment (R. 72).
Perezfileda motion to quash the bind over and dismiss the charge (R. 85). Judge
Hansen granted his motion and dismissed the charge on April 13, 1999 (R. 103).
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Specifically, Judge Hansen found that courts must apply "a case-by-case approach to
determine whether any injury to a jail constitutes 'damage'" under Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-5-418 and that the "otherwise damages" language in the statute "must be restricted
to conduct of a similar nature and comparative gravity to the behavior defined in the
statute" (R. 101). Accordingly, Judge Hansen found that scratching a word in a cell door
is incomparable to "breaking, pulling down, destroying, or flooding" and that such a
scratch does not "interfere with the functions of the jail or constitutes any type of
substantial injury to the facility" (R. 101).
On May 13, 1999, the State filed a Notice of Appeal and this action commenced
(R. 106).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On January 25, 1998, Daniel Cruz Perez was arrested and booked into the Utah
County Jail (Prelim. Tr. at 6). Because Perez refused to cooperate with the booking
process, he was placed into a holding cell where he continued to yell and bang on the cell
door with his hands (Prelim. Tr. at 6-7). When Perez calmed down, he was removed
from the cell and came out holding two keys and a penny (Prelim. Tr. at 13). After he
was removedfromthe cell, the booking officer found that the word "fuck" had been
scratched into the back door of the cell in 4-6 inch letters (Prelim. Tr. at 8). The cell door
required two coats of paint to remove the scratch (Prelim. Tr. at 12). Perez denied
scratching the word into the door (Prelim Tr. at 9).
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Perez asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in quashing the
bindover and ordering dismissal of the information against him. Although the phrase
"otherwise damages" does have a definable meaning, that meaning is ambiguous when
viewed in the context of the statute as a whole. The Utah Supreme Court has set a
precedent in limiting the meaning of broad--yet plain—terms used in criminal statutes
where that language is non-specific and potentially ambiguous in its context.
Accordingly, Perez asserts that the trial court was correct in restricting the term
"otherwise damages" to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity of that
specifically defined in the statute. Moreover, Perez argues that decisions from this Court
support that position.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING THE CHARGE AGAINST PEREZ BECAUSE HIS
CONDUCT DID NOT RISE TO THE REQUISITE LEVEL OF DAMAGE
OR INJURY TO A JAIL REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION
Perez was charged by criminal information with Damaging a Jail, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 (R. 4). After a preliminary
hearing where Perez was bound-over on the charge, Perez filed a motion to quash the
bindover and dismiss the information (R. 85). Judge Hansen granted his motion and the
4

State appealed (R. 101-03). The conduct for which Perez was accused consisted of
scratching the word "fuck" in the holding cell door at the Utah County JaiL
Rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure grants trial courts the
discretion to dismiss a criminal information "for substantial cause and in furtherance of
justice." Moreover, Rule 25(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a
trial court to dismiss a criminal information when "the allegations of the information... do
not constitute the offense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed." Perez asserts
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal information
against him because "the scratching of a door inside a jail in no way interferes with the
functions of the jail or constitutes any type of substantial injury to the facility" (R. 101).
Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 reads: " A person who willfully and intentionally
breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other
place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." While the words
"otherwise damages" do have a definable meaning, that meaning is ambiguous when
viewed in the context of the statute as a whole. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court
has set a precedent in limiting the meaning of broad—yet plain—terminology used in
criminal statutes where that language is non-specific and potentially ambiguous in its
context.
For example, Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-404.1 defines the crime of sexual abuse
of a child. The statute specifically sets forth conduct which would constitute the crime
but also includes a general liability for any conduct where an individual "otherwise takes
5

indecent liberties" with a child. In State ex relJ.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980), the
Utah Supreme Court examined the meaning of "otherwise takes indecent liberties" and
concluded that the term could only pass constitutional muster if read as "referring to
conduct of the same magnitude of gravity as that specifically described in the statute."
610P.2datl296.
In reaching its decision, the Utah Supreme Court clearly applied the principle of
ejusdem generis in deciding that "otherwise takes indecent liberties" was not a catch-all
phrase that encompassed all possible lewd conduct but rather was a phrase that must be
interpreted in light of the specific conduct set forth in the remainder of the statute. In
relation to this, the Court stated:
In interpretation of Section 76-5-404(1), the format of the statute is
significant. In the first part, the legislature describes in detail the specific
conduct proscribed, viz., the actor's touching the anus or genitals of
another. In the second part, which is separated from the first by the
disjunction "or" the conduct is set forth in generalized terms, viz.,
"otherwise takes indecent liberties with another." The use of the
disjunctive in combination with the term "otherwise" is indicative of an
intent to proscribe the type of conduct of equal gravity to that interdicted in
the first part, although the acts are committed in a different way or manner
than that set forth in the first part."
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J.L.S., 610 P.2d at 1295. The court, therefore, found that the definition of "indecent
liberties" and the scope of the statute was limited-rather than expanded—by the phrase
"or otherwise". The court in J.L. S. made this determination despite the fact that both
"indecent" and "liberties" like "damages" have a plain meaning.
Perez asserts that the trial court was correct in his determination that the grafitti
Perez is alleged to have written on the holding cell door cannot be considered "damage"
within the meaning of the law. Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418 reads: " A person who
willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys,floods,or otherwise
damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third
degree."
The proscribed conduct which is expressly enumerated in this section includes
breaking down, pulling down, destroying, or flooding. All of these are clearly acts that
either cause or create a risk of significant destruction and which impede or interfere with
the proper functions of a jail. Perez asserts that the trial court was correct in limiting the
application of the more general prohibition found in the statutes "or otherwise damages"
language to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity.
The State has argued that the plain language of § 76-8-418 and this Court's
decision in State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App.), cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah
1993), mandate that the phrase "otherwise damages" apply to any damage whatsoever
(Br. of Appellant at 4-6). Although this Court in dicta did adopt in Pharris a broad
definition of the term "injury" or "damage", this Court utilized what amounts to a case7

by-case approach in making it determination whether the conduct of the defendant was
sufficient to establish culpability under the statute.
The defendant in Pharris, repeatedly flushed a clogged toilet which resulted in at
least 85 gallons of water pouring onto the floor of the cell and adjoining day room and
water seeping into the basement soaking the backup generator. 846 P.2d at 457. In
addition, the defendant broke the welds on his bunk which-like the rest of his cell, the
day room and basement generator—rendered it unusable. Id. Only under these facts did
this Court rule that the statute was not void for vagueness as applied to the defendant
because his conduct was in line with the statute's "objective of fully protecting the
facilities essential to the functioning of a jail" in that his actions "caused injury to
portions of the jail facility that are essential to its functioning." Pharris, 846 P.2d at 466,
467.
Accordingly although this Court called for a broad interpretation of the term
"injury" or "damages" under the statute, it found liability only where the conduct is of the
same type and gravity as that specifically enumerated in the statute—namely conduct that
damages or injures portions of the jail facility that are essential to its proper functioning
and legislative purpose. Therefore, Perez asserts that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that "scratching a word in a cell door is incomparable to breaking,
pulling down, destroying, or flooding" and that defendant's conduct "in no way
interfere[d] with the functions of the jail or constitute^] any type of substantial injury to
the facility" (R. 101-02).
8

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Perez asks this Court affirm the trial court's quashing of the bindover and
dismissing the charge against him.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tj_ day of December, 1999.

VlA^(7. ^/^A

T

Margaret'P. Lindsay
Counsel for Daniel Cruz Perez

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief to Scott Wilson, Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 E. 300 South, 6th
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this J^day of December, 1999.
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ADDENDA
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of Utah County, State of Utah

CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CASE NO. 981403595

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

DATE: April 13, 1999

vs.

ORDER

DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ,

JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN

Defendant.
Being fully advised of the facts in this matter, the bindover order in this matter is quashed
and the information ordered dismissed.

DATED this

/ J - d a y of.

. 1999.
BY THE C O l M O

cc:

Christine Johnson
Phillip Hadfield

CARMA B&?m5°r/ t e

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. 981403595
DATE: April 13, 1999

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ,

JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN

Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover and Dismiss. Having
reviewed all relevant memoranda on this issue, as well as the October 21, 1998 ruling which
bound this case over for trial, this Court hereby grants the Defendant's motion.
On January 25, 1998, the Defendant was booked into the Utah County Jail. As part of the
booking process, Deputy Matt Pederson placed the Defendant in Pre-booking cell #2. While in
the pre-booking cell, the Defendant cursed loudly and kicked the cell door several times, stopping
this behavior only after warnings from the deputy. As Deputy Pederson removed the Defendant
wasfromthe pre-booking cell he saw that the Defendant had in his possession two keys and one
penny. Upon inspection of the cell, Deputy Pederson saw the word 'Tuck" with a line under it
scratched into the back of the cell door in letters measuring approximately four to six inches in
height.
Based on these events, the Defendant was bound over to stand trial for the offense of
Damaging a Jail, a Third Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (Supp. 1998). Under this
section:
i

A person who willfully and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or
otherwise damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the
third degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (Supp. 1998). This Courtfindsthat the "otherwise damages"
language in the statute must be restricted to conduct of a similar nature and comparable gravity to
the behavior defined in the statute. Courts must apply a case-by-case approach to determine
whether any injury to a jail constitutes "damage" under the statute. See State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d
454, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Clearly, scratching a word in a cell door is incomparable to
breaking, pulling down, destroying, or flooding. In addition, scratching a door inside of a jail in
no way interferes with the functions of the jail or constitutes any type of substantial injury to the
facility. IdL As such, Ifindthat the behavior in this case does not consist of "damage" under the
statute.
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